The original documents are available at this link. The file called “requested_attached..rar” contains the same .msg file submitted by Wright’s team as part of discovery. That file includes three attachments: the original Tulip Trust PDF (Tulip Trust.pdf), a PGP signature for that file (Tulip Trust.pdf.asc) and a PGP-encrypted .tar file (Tulip Trust.pdf.tar.asc). The PDF’s signature correctly validates the PDF file against “David A Kleiman”’s public key. While there are no obvious errors with dates and times, there are several undeniable mistakes that prove this is a forgery.The Tulip Trust PDF was actually signed by “David A Kleiman”’s PGP key, but not actually in 2011. Reason Number 1: the GnuPG version headers indicate the document was signed after 2013
Dr. Matthew Edman described how the GnuPG software would include the full version number during the time period when the Tulip Trust was supposedly signed. For example: “Version: GnuPG v2.0.22”
The change to emit only the major version was made in late November, 2013, and released in mid-2014.Change to only emit major version (eg — Version: GnuPG v2)
The armor version in both .asc files contains only the major version.GnuPG v2 would have been emitted after late 2013
While the version number itself is not signed, it is unbelievable that someone would manually edit the number to remove the minor version. This shows that the signature was not actually made until at least late 2013, and the key did not belong to David Kleiman.Reason Number 2: three of the PGP keys referenced in the Trust document are backdated Wright’s keys were not updated.
This argument has been around for a while. However, the rebuttal given by Craig Wright has been thoroughly debunked. In a nutshell, the evidence is that the keys referenced in the Tulip Trust have certain algorithms in a certain order that were incredibly unlikely to have been present at the time they were created. Wright’s paper argued th...