Bitcoin's stability with fee-only block reward

Hi yall.

Recently there was a post the other day (couldn't find it again) where the author discussed the topic of BTC stability once the fixed block reward become marginal/zero. After reading their post I became curious and looked for more information on the topic. I happened to run into an article written by Pinceton researchers titled "On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward"

I would attach the link but I don't want to get flagged for it. Just google the article name it'll be the first one to come up.

Anyways: after reading through the article I was definitely shocked by some of the rational miner activity that could occur during that future period. Obviously, no one knows the future and we are very far away from this being a concern, but IMO some of the problems that could face BTC seem legitimately concerning. I encourage the curious and brave to read the abstract and intro (at least) of this article and formulate some opinions of your own. The subject material is very interesting.

I would love to hear what you guys think of this research and if their concerns/findings are valid. Personally I'd love to hear some people squash this as FUD, because it definitely has me question some things. Plz let me know your thoughts.

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I made a summary of the abstract and introduction and this is my objective summary of those respective sections

"This paper explores the impact of transaction fees on the security and performance of Bitcoin, particularly as the block reward dwindles over time. While the assumption has been that miners being paid through block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the blockchain, the paper argues that this is not the case. With only transaction fees, the variance of the block reward becomes very high due to the exponentially distributed block arrival time, making it attractive for miners to fork a "wealthy" block to "steal" the rewards therein. This results in an equilibrium with undesirable properties for Bitcoin's security and performance, and even non-equilibria in some circumstances. The paper also revisits selfish mining and shows that it can be made profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low hash power share, who is poorly connected within the network.

The paper discusses the implications of these findings for the future security of Bitcoin and draws lessons for the design of new cryptocurrencies. It provides an illustrative example of how rational, self-interested miners could behave in a block chain with exponentially distributed rewards, revealing novel incentive issues that do not arise when block rewards are fixed. The paper argues that there are new and surprising incentive issues in a transaction-fee regime, even assuming that transactions arrive at a steady rate.

The paper's contributions include a mining strategy simulator to fill gaps and confirm theoretical results, as well as a discussion of potential solutions to the incentive issues raised. The paper suggests a variety of possible solutions. These solutions include changes to the protocol, such as increasing block sizes or adjusting fees, or creating alternative cryptocurrencies with different incentive structures.

Overall, the paper argues that the assumption that block rewards and transaction fees do not affect the security of the blockchain is incorrect and that further research is necessary to address the incentive issues raised in a transaction-fee regime.

Main Points:

• Transaction fees have a significant impact on the security and performance of Bitcoin as the block reward dwindles over time
• The variance of the block reward becomes very high with only transaction fees, making it attractive for miners to fork a "wealthy" block to "steal" the rewards therein
• Selfish mining can be profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low hash power share and who is poorly connected within the network
• The paper suggests possible solutions, including changes to the protocol or creating alternative cryptocurrencies with different incentive structures"

That is all: keep stacking and tell me your thoughts por favor